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I. INTRODUCTION 
National security and trade policy have frequently intersected, but 
over the past several years, conflict has grown. After decades of careful 
avoidance of invoking national security in disputes at the GATT/WTO, 
there has been a recent proliferation of these cases. And most 
controversially, the Trump administration has adopted an expansive 
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interpretation of “national security” to justify imposing tariffs and 
quotas on steel and aluminum products (which it may soon apply to 
automobiles). Many US trading partners responded immediately with 
tariffs of their own, and both the US tariffs and the retaliatory tariffs 
are the subject of litigation that will test the limits of the WTO dispute 
settlement process and the trading system itself. 
A WTO panel ruling in a different case involving national security 
has just been published, but it is not clear that any legal ruling can 
satisfy the parties to disputes where national security has been invoked. 
This Essay describes the problems with litigation on such matters, and 
suggests an alternative mechanism to handle these issues. Instead of 
litigation, a “rebalancing” process like the one used in the context of 
“safeguard” tariffs and quotas should be utilized for national security 
trade restrictions. Where such measures are taken, governments should 
offer compensation (such as lowering trade restrictions in other areas); 
if compensation cannot be worked out, these governments must accept 
equivalent trade restrictions imposed by affected trading partners. In 
this way, the overall balance in the system can be preserved, permanent 
damage to the WTO dispute system avoided, and a potentially 
destructive loophole kept closed. 
II. HISTORY OF THE GATT/WTO “SECURITY” EXCEPTION 
From the earliest post-World War I proposals for international 
trade agreements, it was clear that there would be some sort of 
exception for “security” concerns. Exception provisions for security 
and military issues were included in the 1927 Convention for the 
Abolition of Import and Export Prohibitions and Restrictions,1 and 
were also part of the reciprocal trade agreements signed in the 1930s 
and early 1940s.2 During the negotiations on the International Trade 
Organization and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(“GATT”), similar exceptions were part of the initial US proposal, 
referred to as the Suggested Charter.3 The specific wording evolved 
during the negotiations, but in the final text of the GATT, Article XXI 
said the following: 
 
1.  Convention for the Abolition of Import and Export Prohibitions and Restrictions art. 4, 
Nov. 8, 1927, 46 Stat. 2461. 
2.  See, e.g., Agreement between the United States of America and Mexico Respecting 
Reciprocal Trade art. XVII, U.S.-Mex., Dec. 23, 1942, 57 Stat. 833. 
3.  U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, SUGGESTED CHARTER FOR AN INTERNATIONAL TRADE 
ORGANIZATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS, art. 32 (1946). 
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Security Exceptions 
Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed 
(a) to require any contracting party to furnish any information the 
disclosure of which it considers contrary to its essential security 
interests; or 
(b) to prevent any contracting party from taking any action which 
it considers necessary for the protection of its essential security 
interests 
(i) relating to fissionable materials or the materials from which 
they are derived; 
(ii) relating to the traffic in arms, ammunition and implements of 
war and to such traffic in other goods and materials as is carried 
on directly or indirectly for the purpose of supplying a military 
establishment; 
(iii) taken in time of war or other emergency in international 
relations; or 
(c) to prevent any contracting party from taking any action in 
pursuance of its obligations under the United Nations Charter for 
the maintenance of international peace and security.4  
 
When the WTO was created in 1995, and trade rules were expanded to cover 
trade in services and intellectual property, a similar security exception was 
included in these areas as well.5 
The original negotiators recognized the political difficulties that 
would arise with such an exception and the potential for abuse. As one 
of the lead US negotiators put it: 
 
It is really a question of a balance. We have got to have some 
exceptions. We cannot make it too tight, because we cannot 
prohibit measures which are needed purely for security reasons. 
On the other hand, we cannot make it so broad that, under the guise 
of security, countries will put on measures which really have a 
commercial purpose.6 
 
4.  General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art. XXI, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 
U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT]. 
5.  See GATS art. XIV bis; Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights art. 73, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1197, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299. 
6.  U.N., Econ. & Soc. Council, Second Session of the Preparatory Comm. of the U.N. 
Conf. on Trade & Employment, Thirty-Third Meeting of Commission, U.N. Doc. 
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Determining the true purpose of a measure can be difficult, and the 
negotiators recognized the possibility that protectionist measures could 
be disguised as national security measures. As another GATT 
negotiator put it:  
 
In defence of the text, we might remember that it is a paragraph of 
the Charter of the ITO and when the ITO is in operation I think the 
atmosphere inside the ITO will be the only efficient guarantee 
against abuses of the kind to which the Netherlands Delegate has 
drawn our attention.7 
 
Over most of the history of the GATT/WTO, governments kept 
these concerns in mind and the atmosphere cool, and, for the most part, 
were careful to invoke national security only where it was genuinely 
applicable. In one of the most comprehensive articles on this exception, 
written in 2011, legal scholar Roger Alford noted that “Member States 
have exercised good faith in complying with their trade obligations,” 
as “invocations of the security exception have only been challenged a 
handful of times, and those challenges have never resulted in a binding 
GATT/WTO decision.”8 Alford then recounts the few instances where 
tensions over Article XXI rose to the surface, including over Cold War 
conflicts, the Falklands War, and the US embargoes on Nicaragua and 
Cuba.9 As a result of governments’ good faith efforts, the GATT/WTO 
system has been able to avoid major conflict over this issue and having 
to decide on the precise boundaries of Article XXI. 
Unfortunately, the long period of relative peace and harmony over 
Article XXI seems to be ending, as a WTO dispute between Ukraine 
and Russia has recently provided the first WTO panel interpretation of 
the provision. But a dispute between the Ukraine and Russia is not 
likely to undermine the world trading system.  The more serious 
national security/trade policy controversy taking place is the dispute 
 
E/PC/T/A/PV/33, p. 21 (July 24, 1947), available at  https://docs.wto.org/gattdocs/q/UN/EPCT/
APV-33.PDF [https://perma.cc/VF47-WPAK]. 
7.  Id. 
8.  Roger P. Alford, The Self-judging WTO Security Exception, 2011 UTAH L. REV. 697, 
699 (2011). 
9.  Id. at 706-725. See also Tania Voon, The Security Exception In WTO Law: Entering a 
New Era, 113 AJIL UNBOUND 45, 45-50 (2019), available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/
journals/american-journal-of-international-law/article/security-exception-in-wto-law-entering-
a-new-era/CF8C3DCDF2CD924CAEEDD147840668F9 [https://perma.cc/WQZ4-4Z8P]. 
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over the tariffs recently imposed by the Trump administration on 
imports of steel and aluminum. Nine governments have brought WTO 
complaints against these measures, and many of these governments 
have also retaliated with tariffs of their own. 10  This litigation and 
subsequent retaliation threatens to do serious damage to the system. 
III. THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION’S AGGRESSIVE USE OF 
SECTION 232 
A. Overview of Section 232 
As part of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, and building on 
legislation passed in 1955, Congress included in Section 232 of the 
statute a provision for trade restrictions based on national security. This 
was in the midst of the Cold War, when national security concerns were 
at their height. Congress believed it was appropriate to delegate some 
of its constitutional power over trade to the President in case quick 
action was necessary.11  
Section 232 gives the President the authority to “adjust imports” 
on national security grounds, in other words, to impose trade 
restrictions.12 A decision to impose these restrictions is based on an 
investigation by the Commerce Department, which must involve 
consultations with the Secretary of Defense. The Commerce 
Department investigation can be self-initiated, or it can take place upon 
request of any US department or agency, or the domestic industry. 
During the investigation, the Commerce Department considers a 
number of factors when evaluating the impact of imports on national 
security, including the following: domestic production needed for 
national defense requirements, the capacity of domestic industries to 
meet such requirements, and how the importation of goods affects such 
industries and the capacity of the United States to meet national 
security requirements. The Department must also take into 
 
10.  RACHEL F. FEFER ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R45249, SECTION 232 
INVESTIGATIONS: OVERVIEW AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS (2018), available at 
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R45249.pdf [https://perma.cc/89ZN-9U3A]. 
11 .  Id.; David Knoll, Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962: Industrial 
Fasteners, Machine Tools and Beyond, 10 MD. J. INT’L L. & TRADE 55, 56-57 (1986), available 
at https://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1274&context=mjil 
[https://perma.cc/CHG9-H9S2]. 
12.  19 U.S.C. §1862 (2012). 
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consideration the impact of foreign competition on the economic 
welfare of individual domestic industries. 
The investigation shall last no longer than 270 days, and the 
Secretary of Commerce is required to submit a report to the President 
and include recommendations of action or inaction.13 Within ninety 
days of receiving the report, the President will make a decision, and 
may either follow the recommendations of the Commerce Department 
or take other actions.14 Generally speaking, these actions will be in the 
form of tariffs or quotas, but many variations are possible. 
To date, there have been thirty-one Section 232 investigations, 
twenty-six prior to Trump and five during his term in office. The first 
seven cases covered a wide range of products (including watches, anti-
friction bearings, and power circuit breakers). 15  Six resulted in a 
negative determination, and one was withdrawn by the petitioner.16 
Then during the oil crisis of the 1970s, there were a number of cases 
involving petroleum products, including the first case in which the 
Commerce Department reached a positive determination.17 
Overall, in sixteen cases the Commerce Department determined 
that the goods did not threaten to impair national security; and in eleven 
cases, the Commerce Department found the imported goods threatened 
to impair national security, and provided recommendations to the 
President.18 One case was terminated at the petitioner’s request before 
a conclusion was reached. Three investigations are still pending.19 
The first twenty-four cases were from 1963 to 1994.20 After that, 
the mechanism fell into disuse. There were cases in 1999 and 2001, but 
then nothing for sixteen years.21  Since President Trump took office in 
January 2017, there have been five Section 232 investigations, on steel, 
aluminum, autos and auto parts, uranium, and titanium sponges.22 
 
13.  19 U.S.C. §1862(b)(3) (2012). 
14.  19 U.S.C. § 1862(c) (2012). 
15.  FEFER ET AL., supra note 10. 
16.  FEFER ET AL., supra note 10. 
17.  FEFER ET AL., supra note 10. 
18.  FEFER ET AL., supra note 10. In eight of these eleven cases, the President took action. 
19.  FEFER ET AL., supra note 10. 
20.  FEFER ET AL., supra note 10. 
21.  FEFER ET AL., supra note 10. 
22.  FEFER ET AL., supra note 10. 
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B. The Section 232 Actions on Steel and Aluminum 
As a candidate, Trump vowed to bring jobs in the steel and 
aluminum sectors back: “We are going to put American steel and 
aluminum back into the backbone of our country,” Trump said to his 
supporters in a former steel town in Pennsylvania. 23  Steel and 
aluminum were at the center of his America First trade policy. Soon 
after Trump took office, in April 2017, he instructed the Commerce 
Department to initiate investigations on the national security threat 
posed by steel and aluminum imports.24 The Department immediately 
initiated Section 232 investigations on steel and aluminum and sought 
public comments.25 
In January 2018, the Department issued its report. It concluded 
that certain types of steel and aluminum products imported into the 
United States threaten to impair the national security of the United 
States. The Department recommended that the President reduce 
imports through tariffs or quotas, suggesting three options. For steel, it 
recommended: (1) a tariff of 24% on all steel imports, or (2) a tariff of 
53% or more for steel imports from twelve countries plus a quota for 
all other nations that equals their exports to the United States in 2017, 
or (3) a quota of 63% of each country’s 2017 steel exports to the United 
States. For aluminum, it recommended: (1) a tariff of 7.7% on all 
aluminum imports, or (2) a tariff of 23.6% for aluminum imports from 
five countries plus a quota for all other nations that equals their exports 
to the United States in 2017, or (3) a quota of 86.7% of each country’s 
2017 aluminum exports to the United States.26 
 
23.  Susan Jones, Trump: ‘Put American Steel and Aluminum Back Into the Backbone of 
Our Country’, CNS NEWS (June 29, 2016), https://www.cnsnews.com/news/article/susan-
jones/trump-put-american-steel-and-aluminum-back-backbone-our-country [https://perma.cc/
5LY5-YAW7]. 
24.  Donald J. Trump, Memorandum on Steel Imports and Threats to National Security, 
2017 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. (Apr. 20, 2017), available at  https://www.govinfo.gov/content/
pkg/DCPD-201700259/pdf/DCPD-201700259.pdf [https://perma.cc/2ACV-5NTU]; Donald J. 
Trump, Memorandum on Aluminum Imports and Threats to National Security, 2017 DAILY 
COMP. PRES. DOC. (Apr. 27, 2017), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/DCPD-
201700284/pdf/DCPD-201700284.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z4VV-DHFU]. 
25.  See Notice of Request for Public Comments and Public Hearing on Section 232 
National Security Investigation of Imports of Steel, 82 Fed. Reg. 19205 (Apr. 26, 2017); Notice 
of Request for Public Comments and Public Hearing on Section 232 National Security 
Investigation of Imports of Aluminum, 82 Fed. Reg. 21509 (May 9, 2017). 
26.  U.S. Dep’t of Com., Secretary Ross Releases Steel and Aluminum 232 Reports in 
Coordination with White House, U.S. DEP’T OF COM. (2018), https://www.commerce.gov/news/
press-releases/2018/02/secretary-ross-releases-steel-and-aluminum-232-reports-coordination 
[https://perma.cc/8ESX-GLMR]. 
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On March 8, 2018, President Trump issued two proclamations, 
imposing a twenty-five percent ad valorem tariff on steel products and 
a ten percent ad valorem tariff on aluminum products, taking effect on 
March 23, 2018. Some countries negotiated export quotas to avoid the 
tariffs, and others received temporary tariff exemptions, but as of June 
1, 2018, the tariffs were being imposed on most US trading partners.27 
The tariffs have been estimated to apply to US$44.9 billion worth of 
steel and aluminum imports.28 
In terms of the actual purpose of the actions, there were reasons 
to doubt the claimed national security justification, as the Defense 
Department was skeptical of the value of these tariffs. Then-Secretary 
of Defense James Mattis expressed concern about the “negative 
impact” of the tariffs “on our key allies.”29 He also acknowledged that 
the military’s requirements for steel and aluminum can be satisfied with 
about three percent of domestic production, casting doubt on the 
concerns about the impact of imports and on the justification of the 
Section 232 actions.30 
Beyond national security, a number of explanations have been 
offered by President Trump to justify the tariffs. At times, he has 
emphasized that tariffs would protect the US economy and jobs.31 He 
has also linked the tariffs to trade negotiations, suggesting that these 
tariffs have forced US trading partners to the negotiating table.32 A 
further explanation is that the tariffs are being used to combat unfair 
trade practices.33 Ultimately, we do not know the true motivation of 
 
27.  FEFER ET AL., supra note 10. 
28.  Sherman Robinson et al., Trump’s Proposed Auto Tariffs Would Throw US 
Automakers and Workers Under the Bus, PETERSON INST. FOR INT’L ECON. (May 31, 2018), 
https://piie.com/blogs/trade-investment-policy-watch/trumps-proposed-auto-tariffs-would-
throw-us-automakers-and [https://perma.cc/WRV9-HT6V]. 
29.  Ellen Mitchell, Trump Tariffs Create Uncertainty for Pentagon, THE HILL (Mar. 11, 
2018), https://thehill.com/policy/defense/377697-trump-tariffs-create-uncertainty-for-pentagon 
[https://perma.cc/MF8Z-JPYP]. 
30.  Id. 
31.  Donald J. Trump, (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Mar. 2, 2018, 5:01 AM), 
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/969558431802806272 [https://perma.cc/GT6Y-
AE6W] (“We must protect our country and our workers. Our steel industry is in bad shape. IF 
YOU DON’T HAVE STEEL, YOU DON’T HAVE A COUNTRY!”). 
32.  Andrew Mayeda, Trump Turns Steel Tariffs Into Nafta Bargaining Chip, BLOOMBERG 
(Mar. 6, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-03-06/steel-tariffs-transform-
into-nafta-chip-as-trump-plays-dealmaker. 
33.  A White House fact sheet explained: “President Donald J. Trump is addressing global 
overcapacity and unfair trade practices in the steel and aluminum industries by putting in place 
a 25 percent tariff on steel imports and 10 percent tariff on aluminum imports.” President Donald 
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President Trump for these tariffs—it should be noted that Trump often 
makes it clear that he simply likes tariffs34—and views may vary within 
the administration. 
Many US trading partners responded quickly to the imposition of 
the Section 232 tariffs by imposing retaliatory tariffs. Normally, 
governments would have to bring a WTO complaint first and get a 
ruling that tariffs violate WTO rules before proceeding with retaliatory 
tariffs.35 But here, governments argued that the Section 232 measures 
are not really about national security, and are in fact more like a 
“safeguard” measure designed to protect domestic industries from 
injury caused by imports. 36  As a result, the special “rebalancing” 
provisions of the Safeguards Agreement (discussed in more detail 
below) apply here, and justify immediate retaliation.37 
In addition to these retaliatory tariffs, over the period from April 
2018 to August 2018, nine governments requested consultations at the 
WTO, which is the first step in WTO litigation. WTO litigation can 
take several years, though, and no one was expecting a quick ruling, 
which is why they retaliated pursuant to the safeguards rebalancing 
 
J. Trump is Addressing Unfair Trade Practices That Threaten to Harm Our National Security, 
WHITEHOUSE (Mar. 8, 2018), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/president-
donald-j-trump-addressing-unfair-trade-practices-threaten-harm-national-security/ 
[https://perma.cc/F75W-6TKD]. 




I am a Tariff Man. When people or countries come in to raid the great wealth of our 
Nation, I want them to pay for the privilege of doing so. It will always be the best 
way to max out our economic power. We are right now taking in $billions [sic] in 
Tariffs. MAKE AMERICA RICH AGAIN. 
 
35.  See Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes art. 
22, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, 
1869 U.N.T.S. 401.  
36.  Panels established to review US steel and aluminum tariffs, countermeasures on US 
imports, WORLD TRADE ORG. (Nov. 21, 2018), https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news18_
e/dsb_19nov18_e.htm [https://perma.cc/Z4VJ-79XM]. 
37.  Canada imposed 10 to 25 percent tariffs on approximately US$12.05 billion of US 
exports. Mexico imposed tariffs ranging from 7 to 25 percent on US$3.7 billion of US exports. 
The European Union imposed 10 to 25 percent duties on US$2.91 billion worth of US exports. 
China imposed 15 to 25 percent tariffs on US$2.52 billion worth of US exports. India, Russia, 
and Turkey also imposed tariffs on selected US products, ranging from 4 to 140 percent. FEFER 
ET AL., supra note 10; see also Current Foreign Retaliatory Actions, INT’L TRADE ADMIN. (Apr. 
5, 2019), https://www.trade.gov/mas/ian/tradedisputes-enforcement/retaliations/tg_ian_
002094.asp [https://perma.cc/E8CW-FF9Q]. 
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theory. The complaining governments represent a wide range of the 
WTO Membership, including both big and small, and developed and 
developing: Canada, China, the European Union, India, Mexico, 
Norway, Russia, Switzerland and Turkey.38 
During the course of November 2018 to January 2019, dispute 
settlement panels were established to hear all of these cases. In late 
January, the panels were appointed, and litigation will soon begin.39 
The panelists are Elbio Rosselli of Uruguay, Esteban Conejos of the 
Philippines, and Rodrigo Valenzuela of Chile.40  All have served on 
WTO panels before, but their task in handling this case will 
nevertheless be a difficult one. 
The complainants’ legal claims are fairly straightforward, 
focusing on GATT Article I (MFN treatment) and GATT Article II 
(tariff commitments).41 But as discussed in the next section, it is the US 
defense that will be a challenge to the system, as the United States has 
invoked GATT Article XXI. As repeatedly stated by the United States 
at the relevant DSB meetings, in the US view, after Article XXI is 
invoked the panel cannot even hear the case. In the context of the EU 
complaint, the United States described its position as follows:  
 
Because the United States has invoked Article XXI, there is no 
basis for a WTO panel to review the claims of breach raised by the 
European Union. Nor is there any basis for a WTO panel to review 
the invocation of Article XXI by the United States. . . . If the EU 
maintains its misguided request for a panel to make findings that 
the United States has not acted consistently with WTO rules in this 
dispute, there is no finding a panel could make other than to note 
that the United States has invoked Article XXI.42 
 
While the steel and aluminum tariffs have already caused great 
friction, an even bigger Section 232 test lies ahead: President Trump is 
 
38.  FEFER ET AL., supra note 10.  
39.  Simon Lester, Panels Composed in the Section 232/Retaliation Cases, INT’L ECON. L. 
& POL’Y BLOG (Jan. 28, 2019), https://worldtradelaw.typepad.com/ielpblog/2019/01/panels-
composed-in-the-section-232retaliation-cases.html [https://perma.cc/YUP6-FUZD]. 
40.  Id. 
41.  See, e.g., Request for Consultation by the European Union, United States - Certain 
Measures on Steel and Aluminum Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS548/1 (June 1, 2018).  
42.  Statements by the United States at the Meeting of the WTO Dispute Settlement Body, 
16, WT/DS184/15/ADD.189 (Nov. 21, 2018), https://geneva.usmission.gov/wp-content/
uploads/sites/290/Nov21.DSB_.Stmt_.as-deliv.fin_.public.pdf [https://perma.cc/5T5E-CVKY]. 
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considering taking action against imports of automobiles. If the case 
for trade restrictions on steel and aluminum is a stretch, the case for 
trade restrictions on automobiles bends the rules even further. The 
value of trade potentially affected would be much larger than is the case 
with steel and aluminum. It is estimated that the Section 232 auto tariffs 
could cover over US$200 billion of auto and auto parts imports.43 
Some US trading partners have already warned that they will retaliate 
if tariffs are imposed.44It was reported that the Commerce Department 
submitted its report to President Trump in February 2019.45 President 
Trump has ninety days from that date to make a decision. 
IV. THE THREAT TO THE WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 
MECHANISM 
The administration’s use of Section 232 presents a challenge to 
the WTO dispute settlement system, and even to the WTO itself, due 
to the invocation of GATT Article XXI. WTO dispute settlement has 
had good success over the years in adjudicating core trade issues such 
as ordinary tariffs, trade remedy tariffs, and regulatory trade barriers. It 
cannot induce governments to remove the measures that violate WTO 
rules in every case, but it has a fairly good record of pushing 
governments to comply at least partially. However, there are limits to 
what can be achieved, and it is clear that some sensitive measures 
cannot be dealt with through WTO litigation, just as domestic 
constitutional law cannot resolve every political issue effectively. 
National security measures pretty clearly fall into this category, and 
thus litigation of these measures has been carefully avoided over the 
years. But after decades of restraint over litigating the scope and 
meaning of Article XXI, the Section 232 measures threaten to 
undermine the system by creating a WTO litigation outcome that either 
one side or the other cannot live with. 
Article XXI is not like most other WTO provisions, for two 
reasons. First, its legal interpretation is particularly difficult. 
 
43.  Robinson, et al., supra note 28. 
44.  Doug Palmer & Megan Cassella, U.S. Allies Warn of Retaliation if Trump Imposes 
Auto Tariffs, POLITICO (July 19, 2018), https://www.politico.com/story/2018/07/19/trump-auto-
tariff-commerce-hearing-698100 [https://perma.cc/YKK3-DBPB]. 
45.  David Lawder & David Shepardson, U.S. agency submits auto tariff probe report to 
White House, REUTERS (Feb. 17, 2019), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trade-autos/us-
agency-submits-auto-tariff-probe-report-to-white-house-idUSKCN1Q706C 
[https://perma.cc/AR9C-ZGNB]. 
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Interpretation always presents challenges, but the unique wording of 
Article XXI is a special problem. And second, the sensitivity of the 
issues involved is greater than for any other provision. Protecting the 
environment is serious, but protecting your citizens from possible war 
or similar armed conflict rises to another level. 
In terms of the law, there is no simple answer on the question of 
the provision’s meaning. The use of the word “considers” in sub-
paragraphs (a) and (b) of Article XXI gives the provision a degree of 
“self-judgment”, but the question is how far to take this. Alford 
describes the interpretive possibilities as follows: 
 
According to one interpretation, a Member State can decide for 
itself whether a measure is essential to its security interests and 
relates to one of the enumerated conditions. Another interpretation 
would recognize a Member State’s prerogative to determine for 
itself whether a security exception is applicable, but would impose 
a good faith standard that is subject to judicial review. Under a 
third interpretation, a Member State can decide for itself whether 
“it considers” a measure to be “necessary for the protection of its 
essential security interests,” but the enumerated conditions are 
subject to judicial review.46 
 
Questions about the scope of the exception were raised during the 
GATT negotiations, but they are not easy to resolve as an interpretive 
matter.47 There is no obvious and clear correct answer to the degree of 
scrutiny that is appropriate based on the language of Article XXI. 
This legal uncertainty is reflected in a political divide. Two 
leading powers, the United States and Russia, take one view of the 
provision’s interpretation, while much of the WTO membership takes 
another. The different sides to the issue were brought out in the parties’ 
 
46.  Alford, supra note 8, at 704. 
47.  Simon Lester, The Drafting History of GATT Article XXI: The U.S. View of the Scope 
of the Security Exception, INT’L ECON. L. & POL’Y BLOG (Mar. 11, 2018), 
https://worldtradelaw.typepad.com/ielpblog/2018/03/drafting-history-of-gatt-article-xxi.html 
[https://perma.cc/7L38-VFEH]; Simon Lester, The Drafting History of GATT Article XXI: 
Where Did ‘Considers’ Come From?, INT’L ECON. L. & POL’Y BLOG (Mar. 13, 2018), 
https://worldtradelaw.typepad.com/ielpblog/2018/03/draft-of-gatt-security-exception-
considers.html [https://perma.cc/VDM5-XKRU]; Simon Lester, More GATT Article XXI 
Negotiating History, INT’L ECON. L. & POL’Y BLOG (May 1, 2018), 
https://worldtradelaw.typepad.com/ielpblog/2018/05/more-gatt-article-xxi-negotiating-
history.html [https://perma.cc/NEN7-JD6C]. 
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and third parties’ submissions in a WTO case referred to as Russia - 
Traffic in Transit.48 On one side, the United States and Russia argue 
that the WTO “security” provisions are completely self-judging. In 
their view, once a party has invoked Article XXI, the WTO panel can 
no longer hear the case. Russia states that “neither the Panel nor the 
WTO as an institution has a jurisdiction” over the dispute;49 and the 
United States argues that:  
 
The text of Article XXI, establishing that its invocation is non-
justiciable, is supported by the drafting history of Article XXI. In 
particular, certain proposals from the United States during that 
process demonstrate that the revisions to what became Article XXI 
reflect the intention of the negotiators that the defence be self-
judging, and not subject to the same review as the general 
exceptions contained in GATT 1994 Article XX.50 
 
In contrast, other Members believe that WTO panels must engage 
in some degree of scrutiny of measures for which Article XXI has been 
invoked. For instance, the European Union argues that “Article XXI of 
GATT 1994 is a justiciable provision and that its invocation by a 
defending party does not have the effect of excluding the jurisdiction 
of a panel.”51 And Australia states that, “[T]his deference to Russia 
does not preclude the Panel from undertaking any review of Russia’s 
 
48.  The WTO panel report in this case was circulated on April 5, 2019, while this article 
was in the publication process, so we do not discuss it in depth here. WTO Panel Report, Russia–
Measures Concerning Traffic in Transit, WTO Doc. WT/DS512/R (adopted Apr. 5, 2019). The 
panel's reasoning establishes that WTO panels have the authority to scrutinize measures for 
which a national security justification is claimed, and sets out a legal standard for doing so. Id. 
In this case, the panel found that the Russian measures at issue were justified under Article XXI. 
Id. The panel report was not appealed and was adopted by the DSB on April 26, 2019. Members 
adopt national security ruling on Russian Federation’s transit restrictions, WORLD TRADE 
ORG. (Apr. 26, 2019), https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news19_e/dsb_26apr19_e.htm 
[https://perma.cc/PXD2-VH3R]. The absence of an Appellate Body ruling on these issues leaves 
some uncertainty as to the definitive scope of the provision.   
49.  European Union Third Party Written Submission, Russia - Measures Concerning 
Traffic in Transit, ¶ 10, WT/DS512 (Nov. 8, 2017), http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2018/
february/tradoc_156602.pdf [https://perma.cc/KF8W-9B3A]. 
50.  U.S. Responses to the Panel’s and Russia’s Questions to Third Parties, Russia – 
Measures Concerning Traffic in Transit, ¶ 3, WTO Doc. WT/DS512/R (Feb. 20, 2018), 
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/enforcement/DS/US.3d.Pty.As.Pnl.and.Rus.Qs.fin.(public).p
df [https://perma.cc/52JG-GPWM]. 
51.  European Union Third Party Written Submission, Russia - Measures Concerning 
Traffic in Transit, ¶ 21, WT/DS512 (Nov. 8, 2017), http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2018/
february/tradoc_156602.pdf [https://perma.cc/SZ4W-ATMX]. 
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invocation of Article XXI(b) or dispense with the Panel’s obligation to 
undertake an objective assessment of the matter before it, including an 
objective assessment of the facts of the case.”52 
The Russian - Traffic in Transit case and the Section 232 cases are 
not the only WTO disputes involving national security right now. In 
United Arab Emirates—Measures Relating to Trade in Goods and 
Services, and Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(DS 526), 53  the UAE has argued that the measures at issue were 
adopted for national security reasons, and thus the UAE’s measures are 
allowed by Article XXI, Article XIVbis of the GATS, and Article 73 
of the TRIPS Agreement. The WTO DSB, according to the UAE, does 
not have the jurisdiction nor the capacity to adjudicate national security 
issues.54 And in Saudi Arabia—Measures Concerning the Protection 
of Intellectual Property Rights (DS567),55 Saudi Arabia argued that the 
national security exemption means the WTO has no jurisdiction to hear 
the dispute, noting that “the WTO is not, and cannot be turned into, a 
venue to resolve national security disputes.”56 After decades of peace 
in GATT/WTO dispute settlement with regard to the national security 
issue, we are suddenly experiencing a proliferation of litigation. 
Making the issue even more complicated for WTO dispute 
settlement is the state of the Appellate Body reappointment process. 
Currently, the United States is blocking the appointment of new 
 
52.  Australia’s Third Party Executive Summary, Russia-Measures Concerning Traffic in 
Transit, ¶ 30, WT/DS512 (Feb. 27, 2018), https://dfat.gov.au/trade/organisations/wto/wto-
disputes/Documents/ds512-australian-third-party-executive-summary-270218.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/P6HU-NHD2]. 
53.  Request for the Establishment of a Panel by Qatar, United Arab Emirates – Measures 
Relating to Trade in Goods and Services, and Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights, WTO Doc. WT/DS526/2 (Oct. 6, 2017). 
54.  Dispute Settlement Body, Minutes of Meeting – Held in the Centre William Rappard, 
¶ 4.4, WT/DSB/M/403 (Oct. 23, 2017) (“The system was simply not equipped to adjudicate the 
national security issues raised …, nor was there any support for the notion that it was intended 
to adjudicate such issues. …  there was clear language  … that excluded such national security 
matters from the jurisdiction of the WTO.”) [hereinafter DSB Minutes]. 
55.  Request for the Establishment of a Panel by Qatar, Saudi Arabia – Measures 
Concerning the Protection of Intellectual Property Rights, WTO Doc. WT/DS567/3 (Nov. 9, 
2018). 
56.  Panels Established to Review India, Swiss Complaints Against US Tariffs, WORLD 
TRADE ORG. (Dec. 4, 2018), https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news18_e/dsb_
04dec18_e.htm [https://perma.cc/7RHD-P5NH] [hereinafter WTO Panel Established] 
(“[N]othing can require any government to engage in dispute settlement procedures in such 
circumstances of national security. A panel has no power to make a finding in this matter, and 
the WTO is not, and cannot be turned into, a venue to resolve national security disputes, Saudi 
Arabia said”). 
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Appellate Body Members (i.e., judges) which has created a backlog of 
appeals and the possibility that by the end of the year there will not be 
enough people on the Appellate Body to hear cases.57  The result could 
be a WTO panel ruling on one of the national security cases that gets 
appealed and sent into limbo. Until the status of the Appellate Body 
going forward is clarified, a great deal of uncertainty will remain. 
However, there is a larger problem than figuring out the proper 
interpretation of the provision: if a WTO panel or the Appellate Body 
were to rule that Article XXI did not justify the US steel and aluminum 
tariffs, would the United States comply with that ruling? Given the US 
rhetoric on this issue, this seems unlikely.58 And in the event of non-
compliance, the only remedy is for the DSB to authorize a suspension 
of concessions under which the complainants could impose tariffs or 
other retaliation of their own, but most of the complainants have 
already retaliated, relying on the legal theory that the US measures are 
safeguard measures and that “rebalancing” under Safeguards 
Agreement Article 8 is permitted immediately.59 As a matter of law, 
such an assertion has little basis, and further undermines confidence in 
the system. The Section 232 measure was not taken pursuant to the US 
domestic safeguards law; it was not notified to the WTO as a 
safeguards measure; and its design, structure, and architecture makes 
clear that it is not a safeguard measure.60 Responding to violations of 
the rules with other violations of the rules leaves everyone wondering 
if the rules have any value. As a result, it is not clear how WTO dispute 
settlement can help in this case. With such a broad loophole being 
 
57.  James Bacchus, How to Solve the WTO Judicial Crisis, CATO AT LIBERTY (Aug. 6, 
2018), https://www.cato.org/blog/how-solve-wto-judicial-crisis [https://perma.cc/5NAD-
Z962]. 
58.  In a recent DSB meeting, the United States reiterated that its invocation of Article XXI 
should not be reviewed by the panel: “[A WTO review] would undermine the legitimacy of the 
WTO’s dispute settlement system and even the viability of the WTO itself.” WTO Panel 
Established, supra note 56. 
59.  For an overview of rebalancing under the Safeguards Agreement, see Matthew R. 
Nicely & David T. Hardin, Article 8 of the WTO Safeguards Agreement: Reforming the Right to 
Rebalance, 23 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT 699 (2008). 
60.  Simon Lester, How To Determine if a Measure Constitutes a Safeguard Measure, 
INT’L ECON. L. & POL’Y BLOG, (Aug. 15, 2018), https://worldtradelaw.typepad.com/ielpblog/
2018/08/how-to-determine-if-a-measure-constitutes-a-safeguard-measure.html 
[https://perma.cc/4392-ZWKW]. For more discussion on the issue, see Steve Charnovitz, EU 
Can Retaliate Immediately Against Trump’s Metal Tariffs, INT’L ECON. L. & POL’Y BLOG, 
(Mar. 9, 2018), https://worldtradelaw.typepad.com/ielpblog/2018/03/eu-can-retaliate-
immediately-against-trumps-metal-tariffs.html [https://perma.cc/STF8-NVW9]. 
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exposed, and triggering a response that opens another loophole, there 
are real concerns that the system will be seriously undermined. 
At the same time, while “rebalancing” as practiced by US trading 
partners here may not solve the problem, the concept may nevertheless 
offer a way forward for this kind of dispute. By adapting it for use 
directly in the context of national security, “rebalancing” could provide 
a solution to the impasse. While an attempt to expand existing 
safeguards rebalancing rules beyond their scope undermines the rule of 
law, a new rebalancing regime designed specifically for the national 
security context could help restore it. 
V. REBALANCING UNDER THE SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT 
The idea of some type of “rebalancing” in response to “safeguard” 
measures originates in the reciprocal trade agreements negotiated by 
the United States and other countries in the 1930s.61 The first modern 
safeguard provision appeared in the US-Mexico Reciprocal Trade 
Agreement of 1942. It provides that where a country will “withdraw or 
modify a concession” as a safeguard to protect domestic industry, “it 
shall give notice in writing to the Government of the other country as 
far in advance as may be practicable and shall afford such other 
Government an opportunity to consult with it in respect of the proposed 
action”; if no agreement is reached, the other government “shall be free 
within thirty days after such action is taken to terminate this Agreement 
in whole or in part on thirty days’ written notice.”62 The consultations 
provide an opportunity for the parties to reach agreement on 
compensation, e.g., lowering tariffs on other products.63 
This idea was carried over to the GATT negotiations, where the 
United States proposed the initial text. At this point, “termination” was 
replaced with “suspension of obligations or concessions” as the 
response where compensation could not be agreed.64 The provision 
 
61.  See, e.g., Reciprocal Trade Agreement of 1938 art. 19, U.K.-U.S., Nov. 17, 1938. 
62.  Reciprocal Trade Agreement of 1942 art. 11 ¶ 2, Dec. 23, 1942. 
63.  JOHN JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT 565 (1969). 
64.  See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, supra note 3, art. 29 ¶ 2: 
 
If agreement among the interested Members with respect to the proposed action is 
not reached, the Member which proposes to take the action shall, nevertheless, be 
free to do so, and if such action is taken the other affected Members shall then be 
free, within sixty days after such action is taken, to suspend on sixty days’ written 
notice to the Organization the application to the trade of the Member taking such 
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was refined further during the negotiations, and the London Draft of 
the GATT refers to suspension of “substantially equivalent obligations 
or concessions.” 65  In the final version of the GATT, the relevant 
provisions appear in Article XIX, paragraphs two and three.66 
 
action, of any of the obligations or concessions under this Chapter the suspension 
of which the Organization does not recommend against. 
 
65.  See London Draft of a Charter for an International Trade Organization, art. 34 ¶ 2: 
 
If agreement among the interested Members with respect to the action is not 
reached, the Member which proposes to take or continue the action shall, 
nevertheless, be free to do so, and if such action is taken or continued the other 
affected Members shall then be free, not later than sixty days after such action is 
taken, to suspend, upon the expiration of sixty days from the date on which written 
notice of such suspension is received by the Organization, the application to the 
trade of the Member taking such action, of such substantially equivalent 
obligations or concessions under this Chapter the suspension of which the 
Organization does not oppose. 
 
66.  GATT, supra note 4, art. XIX ¶ 2 states: 
 
Before any contracting party shall take action pursuant to the provisions of 
paragraph 1 of this Article, it shall give notice in writing to the CONTRACTING 
PARTIES as far in advance as may be practicable and shall afford the 
CONTRACTING PARTIES and those contracting parties having a substantial 
interest as exporters of the product concerned an opportunity to consult with it in 
respect of the proposed action. When such notice is given in relation to a 
concession with respect to a preference, the notice shall name the contracting party 
which has requested the action. In critical circumstances, where delay would cause 
damage which it would be difficult to repair, action under paragraph 1 of this 
Article may be taken provisionally without prior consultation, on the condition 
that consultation shall be effected immediately after taking such action. 
 
See also GATT art. XIX ¶ 3: 
 
(a) If agreement among the interested contracting parties with respect to the action 
is not reached, the contracting party which proposes to take or continue the action 
shall, nevertheless, be free to do so, and if such action is taken or continued, the 
affected contracting parties shall then be free, not later than ninety days after such 
action is taken, to suspend, upon the expiration of thirty days from the day on 
which written notice of such suspension is received by the CONTRACTING 
PARTIES, the application to the trade of the contracting party taking such action, 
or, in the case envisaged in paragraph 1 (b) of this Article, to the trade of the 
contracting party requesting such action, of such substantially equivalent 
concessions or other obligations under this Agreement the suspension of which 
the CONTRACTING PARTIES do not disapprove. 
(b) Notwithstanding the provisions of sub-paragraph (a) of this paragraph, where 
action is taken under paragraph 2 of this Article without prior consultation and 
causes or threatens serious injury in the territory of a contracting party to the 
domestic producers of products affected by the action, that contracting party shall, 
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Practice during the time of the GATT suggests that compensation 
was used extensively early on. However, it tapered off over the years. 
As of 1987, there had been twenty instances of agreement or offers of 
compensation (ten cases during 1950-59, eight cases in 1960-69, one 
case in 1970-79 and one case in 1980-87).67 
During the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations, the specific 
requirements for rebalancing were discussed and debated at great 
length,68 and the provision evolved over the course of the talks.69 In the 
end, the GATT Article XIX requirements were elaborated further in the 
Safeguards Agreement. Under Article 8 of the Agreement, a 
government proposing to apply a safeguard measure or seeking an 
extension of a safeguard measure shall try to maintain a substantially 
equivalent level of concessions and other obligations, and in order to 
achieve this objective, “the Members concerned may agree on any 
adequate means of trade compensation for the adverse effects of the 
measure on their trade.”70 If compensation cannot be agreed, retaliation 
is permitted almost immediately where the justification for the 
safeguard measure is based only on a relative increase in imports, but 
has to wait three years if there has been an absolute increase in 
imports.71 
 
where delay would cause damage difficult to repair, be free to suspend, upon the 
taking of the action and throughout the period of consultation, such concessions 
or other obligations as may be necessary to prevent or remedy the injury. 
67.  GATT Secretariat, Drafting History of Article XIX and Its Place in GATT, GATT Doc. 
MTN.GNG/NG9/W/7, ¶ 22 (Sept. 16, 1987), https://www.wto.org/gatt_docs/English/
SULPDF/92020271.pdf [https://perma.cc/ER2Y-D3SD]; WORLD TRADE ORG., ANALYTICAL 
INDEX OF THE GATT 525 (1995), available at https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/
publications_e/ai17_e/gatt1994_art19_gatt47.pdf [https://perma.cc/MAE5-E94P] [hereinafter 
GATT Index]. 
68.  2 THE GATT URUGUAY ROUND: A NEGOTIATING HISTORY (1986-1992) 1773-74 
(Terence P. Stewart ed., 1993). 
69.  See Safeguards, Draft Text by the Chairman, MTN.GNG/NG9/W/25, paras. 23-25, 
June 27, 1989; Safeguards, Draft Text by the Chairman, Revision 1, 
MTN.GNG/NG9/W/25/Rev.1, paras. 25-27, Jan. 15, 1990; Chairman’s Report on the Status of 
Work in the Negotiating Group, MTN.GNG/NG9/W/25/Rev.2, paras. 16-18, July 13, 1990; 
Draft Text of an Agreement, MTN.GNG/NG9/W/25/Rev.3, paras. 17-19, Oct. 31, 1990. 
70.  Agreement on Safeguards, art. 8 ¶ 1, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing 
the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1869 U.N.T.S. 154 [hereinafter Agreement on 
Safeguards]. 
71.  Agreement on Safeguards, art. 8 ¶ 3 states: 
 
The right of suspension referred to in paragraph 2 shall not be exercised for the 
first three years that a safeguard measure is in effect, provided that the safeguard 
measure has been taken as a result of an absolute increase in imports and that such 
a measure conforms to the provisions of this Agreement. 
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The basic idea behind rebalancing is as follows. When countries 
negotiate trade agreements, the “concessions” and other obligations 
they take on—including commitments to reduce tariffs, to avoid certain 
protectionist domestic laws, and various other obligations—are part of 
an overall balance. Roughly speaking, each side accepts a particular 
degree of liberalization or other obligations, which constitutes the 
balance that was agreed to. 
There are times when things get out of balance, however. One 
example is where a government believes another government has taken 
actions that violate the agreement. After adjudication of this matter, if 
a violation is found, the offending government can remove or modify 
the measure or offer some sort of compensation. If it does not do either 
one, it will be subject to trade retaliation by the complaining 
government in an amount equivalent to the effect of the violation. In 
this way, the balance is restored. 
In some circumstances, adjudication is not required first. In the 
context of safeguards, the very nature of the measure indicates that the 
balance has been upset. If a government imposes a tariff or quota as a 
safeguard measure, with rare exceptions that measure will constitute 
withdrawal or modification of a tariff concession or breach of the 
obligation not to impose quotas. When that happens, the balance needs 
to be restored. Ideally, that would take place through compensation in 
the form of trade liberalization in other areas by the government 
imposing the safeguard measure. However, where compensation 
cannot be worked out, the affected countries are allowed to raise their 
own tariffs in an equivalent amount. That may not be ideal from the 
perspective of trade liberalization, but it acts as a deterrent against the 
abusive use of safeguard measures. 
VI. A REBALANCING PROPOSAL FOR NATIONAL SECURITY 
Under WTO rules, governments may impose tariffs and other 
trade restrictions beyond what was agreed for a variety of reasons, 
including the following: temporary protection as safeguards; as a 
response to dumping or subsidies; for environmental, public morals, or 
public health reasons; or in support of national security. 72  It is a 
political and policy decision whether to make rebalancing available. 
Traditionally, immediate rebalancing has only been available for 
 
72.  See GATT, supra note 4, arts. XIX, VI, XX, and XXI.  
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safeguards, but the case could be made for rebalancing in other contexts 
too. 
In thinking about the circumstances in which rebalancing should 
be available, the following two categories of challenged measures may 
help guide the analysis. The first category is measures that are alleged 
to violate WTO obligations, but for which consistency is contested: 
The complaining party claims there is a violation, but the responding 
party denies it (the responding party may invoke an exception as well). 
For these measures, if a violation is found by a WTO panel or the 
Appellate Body, the complaining party hopes that the measure will be 
brought into compliance (or at least applied in a manner that is 
consistent with certain core GATT principles, in the case of the Article 
XX chapeau). 73  If it is not brought into compliance, retaliation or 
compensation (i.e. rebalancing) are available. Thus, in these situations, 
compliance is the objective, but eventual rebalancing can be accepted 
as an alternative solution. 
The second category is measures which are acknowledged to 
violate the rules, and there is no hope of achieving compliance as long 
as the conditions in an exception are satisfied. With safeguard 
measures, for example, there is no question that the withdrawal of a 
concession violates the rules, and there is no hope of compliance 
(unless the conditions for imposing a safeguard measure have not been 
satisfied, of course, in which case the measure must be withdrawn). As 
a result, for safeguard measures, the step involving a determination of 
whether the measure violates general GATT obligations such as 
Articles II and XI is not necessary in order to rebalance, as immediate 
rebalancing is available.74 
Consider the difference between a safeguard measure, on the one 
hand, and an environmental measure under GATT Article XX(g), on 
the other.75 The main issue in a typical safeguard case at the WTO is 
whether the measure satisfies the conditions for being classified as a 
safeguard measure. 76  If it does, any inconsistency with general 
principles such as complying with tariff commitments is irrelevant. By 
contrast, for environmental measures, compliance with the obligations 
is almost always contested, and even if a measure is classified as an 
 
73.  GATT, supra note 4, art. XX.  
74.  See GATT, supra note 4, art. XIX; Agreement on Safeguards, supra note 70, art. 8. 
75.  GATT, supra note 4, art. XX(g). 
76.  See, e.g., Agreement on Safeguards, supra note 70, art. 4 ("Determination of Serious 
Injury or Threat Thereof"). 
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environmental measure that falls under Article XX(g), the obligations 
in the Article XX chapeau apply, providing another opportunity to 
consider whether the measure is justified. 
National security fits much more naturally into the safeguard 
category. Where national security is invoked, a violation is generally 
assumed and not contested. If the national security justification is 
upheld, there is no hope of inducing compliance with WTO obligations, 
and thus moving on to the rebalancing stage immediately is 
appropriate. 
Beyond the theory of these two different categories of measures, 
in the national security context there are several practical arguments for 
allowing a similar kind of rebalancing. First, retaliation is already 
happening. In the case of the Section 232 tariffs, as noted above, a 
number of governments have declared the measures to be safeguard 
measures and are applying retaliatory tariffs.77 Instituting rebalancing 
rules here would provide an opportunity to replace retaliatory tariffs 
with compensatory liberalization. In addition, in circumstances where 
compensation is not possible, it would formalize the retaliation process 
and make it more orderly, limiting the possibility of a trade war that 
spirals out of control. 
Second, as explained earlier, WTO dispute settlement probably 
cannot help here. A ruling that the Section 232 measures violate GATT 
obligations and are not justified under Article XXI is not likely to make 
the United States comply. In addition, retaliation is already being 
imposed by many countries even without authorization. 
Finally, rebalancing would have an important benefit by limiting 
the abuse of the provisions. A full WTO dispute proceeding typically 
lasts between two and four years, depending on the complexity of the 
case. National security measures are particularly susceptible to abuse 
due to the vagueness of the obligation, and rebalancing would reduce 
the time that governments can impose import restrictions for national 
security purposes without any response from trading partners. 
Rebalancing of national security measures can draw on principles 
from the safeguards arena, but would have its own characteristics and 
a different focus. One of its primary goals would be transparency. As 
things stand now, governments have the ability to impose trade 
restrictions for protectionist purposes but then later invoke Article XXI 
during litigation. There are requirements that Members “should be 
 
77.  FEFER ET AL., supra note 10. 
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informed to the fullest extent possible of trade measures taken under” 
GATT Article XXI and GATS Article XIV bis,78 but the notification 
obligation needs to be stronger. It would be desirable to have all 
national security trade restrictions notified as such immediately upon 
their imposition, and even during the process of internal domestic 
deliberation, in order to have a proper debate and discussion. Bringing 
these cases to light early, and having WTO Members think carefully 
about the proper scope of the exception, is of great value. To this end, 
the national security rebalancing rules should encourage notification 
and explanation of national security tariffs by offering more time 
before rebalancing can be applied where measures have been notified. 
For example, rebalancing can be immediate where an Article XXI 
justification is invoked as part of litigation where there has been no 
notification/explanation, but must wait six months to a year where 
notification has been given. 
To help oversee these discussions, there should be a Committee 
on National Security Measures formed to examine these measures and 
any proposed rebalancing, through which Members could meet 
regularly to consider the practice in this area. Committees play an 
important role in many policy areas covered by the WTO and could 
help with national security issues as well. Committee meetings provide 
an opportunity to resolve conflicts outside the context of litigation, 
which is inherently contentious and can increase tensions. 
Compensation is the preferred approach to rebalancing. Ideally, 
governments that impose tariffs or other restrictions on specific 
products for national security purposes would offer to reduce tariffs or 
restrictions on other products or services. Adding services as a 
compensation option may be significant. One of the reasons 
compensation has not worked as well in recent years in the safeguards 
context is that as tariff levels have decreased, it has become harder for 
countries invoking safeguards to find alternative products on which 
they could give meaningful concessions.79 Adding services to the mix 
 
78.  See Decision Concerning Article XXI of the General Agreement, ¶ 1, WTO Doc. 
L/5426 (Dec. 2, 1982), https://www.wto.org/gatt_docs/english/SULPDF/91000212.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/6DB2-WZU4]; GATT Index, supra note 67, at 606, available at 
https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/gatt_ai_e/art21_e.pdf [https://perma.cc/KQ3V-
B35X]; General Agreement on Trade in Services art. XIV bis ¶ 2, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1B, 1869 U.N.T.S. 183. 
79.  JOHN JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM 168 (1994); Chad Bown & Meredith 
Crowley, Safeguards in the World Trade Organization, CATO INST. (Feb. 2003), 
http://people.brandeis.edu/~cbown/papers/bown_crowley_kluwer.pdf [https://perma.cc/78AU-
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would open a wide range of compensation possibilities, especially 
considering how few services commitments most countries have made 
and thus how much potential there is for additional liberalization. 
Negotiations over the extent of this compensation will never be 
easy, but they can be facilitated through carefully designed rules. For 
example, there could be a requirement that in order to impose an import 
restriction for national security reasons, a government must identify 
three products or services for which it would consider negotiating 
compensatory liberalization. Forcing governments to suggest possible 
compensation could give the negotiating process a boost. 
When compensation cannot be agreed, however, retaliation 
designed to restore balance is also a possibility. Retaliation is contrary 
to the main purpose of trade agreement, which is trade liberalization, 
but if it can serve as a deterrent to protectionist abuses (by creating a 
negative impact on producers in the imposing country), it can serve a 
useful role. It can also keep trade wars from spiraling out of control by 
establishing an agreed upon procedure for retaliatory tariffs. 
VII. CONCLUSIONS 
Not every dispute can be resolved through litigation. The 
proposals outlined here are designed to help provide a political solution 
to disputes over trade restrictions based on national security. They are 
fairly straightforward as a policy matter, although much more debate is 
needed on the specific details. This paper is intended to launch a 
discussion and is certainly not the final word. 
As governments continue to push forward with bilateral, regional 
and multilateral trade agreements, there will be opportunities to 
experiment with this kind of mechanism. The Trump administration is 
unlikely to support the proposals made here, but other governments that 
are concerned about the abuse of national security measures can 
incorporate provisions along these lines in agreements they sign. In this 
way, the norm can spread, with the hope that its usefulness will be 
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demonstrated, and with the aim of eventual inclusion in a multilateral 
agreement. 
 
